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ABSTRACT
International political economy (IPE) has explained financial globalization as the
result of states deciding to open up and liberalize domestic financial systems.
Complementing this ‘negative integration’ view, we present a theory of financial
globalization during the 1970s that emphasizes the importance of ‘positive integra-
tion.’ Credit money systems are characterized by public-private infrastructural entan-
glements, the management of which require substantial institutional work by
monetary technocrats, both at the domestic and at the international level. To illus-
trate our theory, we trace the expansion of the Eurodollar market during the 1970s.
Drawing on archival records from the ‘Standing Committee on the Euro-currency
Market’ at the Bank for International Settlements, we show how this group of G-10
central bankers sought to elevate the management of infrastructural entanglements
from the domestic to the international level. By ensuring that the Eurodollar market
did not interfere with domestic monetary governability, while seeking to provide
protection for issuers of Eurodollars, monetary technocrats helped establish the
institutional infrastructure for the expansion and globalization of the offshore US
dollar system.
KEYWORDS
International monetary system; central bank cooperation; offshore money; Bank for International
Settlements; petrodollar recycling; lender of last resort
1. Introduction
Today, more than ever, we live in a “dollar world” (Gourinchas, 2019). The unit of
account of one country, the US dollar, serves as an international trade, reserve, and
funding currency. The preeminent source of this international currency is the
Eurodollar market, in which banks outside of the United States – ‘Euro’ here is a
synonym for ‘offshore’ – make loans and accept deposits denominated in US dol-
lars. The Eurodollar market emerged in London in the late 1950s, before it
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expanded and consolidated during the 1970s. How did that decisive phase of finan-
cial globalization come about? The literature offers two main accounts. Economists
view financial globalization as the outcome of market forces – at a time of growing
international trade, the demand for dollar deposits and loans increased. The market
delivered, while states merely stepped out of the way. By contrast, scholars of
International Political Economy (IPE) – without denying the existence of market
pressures – insist on the causal primacy of states. The US and UK governments, in
particular, saw their interests align with the interests of their internationally
expanding financial sectors and therefore made the strategic decision to liberalize
financial markets. Despite their differences, however, both explanations view nega-
tive integration – the removal of restrictions on capital flows – as a sufficient con-
dition for financial globalization. From this perspective, the growth of transnational
capital flows follows automatically from financial liberalization and the elimination
of capital controls.
The theoretical argument put forward in this paper is that financial globalization
requires more than negative integration. We develop a mid-range theory that
explains positive integration as the outcome of technocratic agency within a specific
structural context. The structure of credit money is “essentially hybrid,” meaning
its creation and circulation involve both public and private elements (Mehrling,
2013, 2015). In this framework, “infrastructural entanglements” between states and
private financial actors are a core feature of the monetary system: States depend on
financial markets to exercise monetary control, while private financial institutions
issuing credit money depend on public backstops (Braun, 2018a). At the level of
agency, our theory focuses analytical attention on monetary technocrats – primarily
central bankers – defined as public servants acting in and through private markets.
Monetary technocrats have agency precisely because they are situated at the bound-
ary between the public and private spheres. While acting by transacting in private
financial markets, their state-granted privileges make them dominant actors in
those markets, allowing them to “govern through financial markets” (Braun et al.,
2018). They manage public-private infrastructural entanglement through two types
of institutional work – they regulate private banking activities to maintain domestic
monetary governability, while at the same time providing backstops and other
forms of protection to domestic banks in their international operations.
We develop this argument through a historical study of the work of the
Standing Committee on the Euro-currency Market, established in 1971 by the G-10
central banks at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. While
Helleiner (1994, pp. 16, 18) noted the emergence of a “Basel-based regime” in the
1970s, the lack of archival records meant that the inner workings of this regime
remained a black box even in the most insightful accounts of that period (Hawley,
1987; Kapstein, 1994; Spiro, 1999). Newly available archival evidence allows us to
paint a much more nuanced picture of the agency of monetary technocrats –
including, especially, European ones – in the rise of the Eurodollar market.
Thus, the historical contribution of this paper is to show that the growth of the
Eurodollar market during the 1970s was linked to the creation of an institutional
infrastructure supporting and stabilizing offshore credit money. We show that the
Standing Committee faced significant epistemic uncertainty about the nature and
workings of the Eurodollar market and puzzled over its consequences for domestic
liquidity and inflation, and thus for monetary governability. Amidst these
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discussions in Basel, the Bank of England successfully prevented G-10 central banks
from imposing restrictive regulations on the Eurodollar market, arguing that gov-
ernability was not at risk. We also show that from the beginning, central banks
sought to mitigate the risks from Eurodollar transactions for their own domestic
banks, notably by incorporating official Eurodollar deposits and Eurodollar swaps
in their monetary policy toolkits. Following the 1973–74 oil price shock, the
Standing Committee members converged on the view that the private banking sys-
tem should ‘recycle’ petrodollars held by OPEC countries by making Eurodollar
loans to oil-importing developing countries. To encourage banks to engage in risky
lending on such a massive scale, central banks assured private banks of liquidity
support should large losses materialize, providing a lender-of-last-resort infrastruc-
ture at the international level.
While our empirical analysis is limited to the Euro-currency markets in the
1970s, the sophistication of the institutional infrastructure underpinning today’s
offshore US dollar system suggests that the scope conditions for our theoretical
argument are broader (Murau, 2018). The infrastructure of protection that monet-
ary technocrats improvised in the 1970s has expanded into a “global financial safety
net” (Henning, 2015; McDowell, 2017): the lending facilities of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have multiplied, regional financing arrangements have
mushroomed, governments have built up their foreign currency reserve assets, and
the Federal Reserve maintains currency swap lines with a substantial number of
central banks, six of which are unlimited and unconditional (Sahasrabuddhe, 2019;
Tooze, 2018). At the same time, central banks sought to maintain monetary gov-
ernability in a world in which domestic economic conditions increasingly became
subject to a “global financial cycle” (Bauerle Danzman et al., 2017; Rey, 2015). The
development of inflation targeting and macroprudential regulation can both be
seen in that light (Krampf, 2019; Thiemann, 2019).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section two outlines our
positive integration theory of financial globalization, based on three conceptual
building blocks – the hybridity of money, the unique institutional position of mon-
etary technocrats, and their management of infrastructural entanglement with a
view towards governability and protection. Section three applies this framework to
reconstruct the expansion of the Eurodollar market during the 1970s, drawing on
original archival material from the BIS. We trace how central bankers worked
towards maintaining domestic monetary governability, while incentivizing and pro-
tecting Eurodollar lending to developed countries, thus underwriting the acceler-
ation of financial globalization. Section four concludes and presents avenues for
future research.
2. Toward a positive integration theory of financial globalization
There is broad agreement that the origins of the most recent historical period of
financial globalization can be traced to the birth of the Eurodollar market in 1957
– well before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s (Burn,
2006). What has been debated, however, is the explanation for this “resurrection of
global finance” (Cohen, 1996). The baseline narrative was given by economists,
who emphasize the spontaneous, market-driven nature of global banking.
According to this view, the growth of the Eurodollar market during the 1960s was
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driven by banks seeking to evade domestic restrictions, as well as by the growing
demand for trade-related credit (Bell, 1973; Johnston, 1983). IPE scholars have
criticized this economic explanation and stressed the active role of states and of
monetary power (Andrews, 2006). According to this literature governments made
active decisions, on the basis of both domestic and international considerations, to
liberalize domestic financial markets and eliminate capital controls (Block, 1977;
Cohen, 1978; Helleiner, 1994; Kirshner, 1997; Strange, 1986; Underhill, 1991).
Scholars have debated whether the US acted defensively (Frieden, 1987; Krampf,
2019) or whether, operating from a position of strength, it sought to project mon-
etary and financial power (Gowan, 1999; Konings, 2011; Strange, 1987). Still others
have emphasized the role of the International Monetary Fund (Abdelal, 2007;
Copelovitch, 2010; Kentikelenis & Babb, 2019).
Their differences notwithstanding, the market-led and state-led views of finan-
cial globalization share an under-institutionalized conception of (international)
money. In essence, both approaches assume a world in which nation states issue
and control national currencies,1 and in which international capital flows occur
naturally if governments allow them. From this perspective, liberalizing domestic
financial markets and eliminating international capital controls were sufficient
measures to unleash financial globalization. This amounts to a theory of “negative
integration” (Scharpf, 1999), underpinned by the notion that “the unique mobility
and fungibility of money” means that unlike goods or people, money moves easily
across national borders. As a consequence, the United States and Britain could cre-
ate a “more open financial order” simply by providing “financial market operators
an extra degree of freedom” (Helleiner, 1994, p. 18, see also chapter 9).
The central argument of this paper is that theories of negative integration alone
cannot explain financial globalization in general and the emergence of a global off-
shore US dollar system in particular. Rather, we argue that positive integration
played an essential role in the process. We show that the “mobility and fungibility”
of US-dollar-denominated liabilities of private banks required a sophisticated institu-
tional architecture that comprised infrastructural entanglements between public and
private actors. While this argument is widely accepted for the domestic level, the lit-
erature on the international financial system has emphasized the absence of global
regulators, a global monetary authority, or a global lender of last resort. The remain-
der of this section develops the theoretical rationale underpinning our argument that
financial globalization requires positive institutional integration also at the inter-
national level, achieved first and foremost by monetary technocrats. Our theoretical
framework consists of three building blocks – the hybridity of money (2.1), monetary
technocrats as actors in their own right (2.2), who manage public-private infrastruc-
tural entanglements both at the domestic and at the international level (2.3).
2.1. Hybrid international money
To explain why positive integration is needed for the globalization of financial mar-
kets, it is essential to understand the hybrid nature of (international) money
(Germain, 1997, p. 11). In a credit money system, certain actors’ liabilities are other
actors’ money. Private banks enjoy a state-granted privilege in that system – they
are allowed to create money in the form of bank deposits (Hockett & Omarova,
2017; Ricks, 2016). When a bank issues a loan to a borrower, it expands its balance
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sheets simultaneously on both sides. On the liability side of the bank’s balance
sheet, a newly created deposit appears. Figure 1 illustrates this process: a borrower
incurs a debt (liability) by taking out a loan from the bank (an asset of the bank).
Simultaneously, the bank incurs a liability by depositing the loaned amount into
the customer’s account – this claim to be paid central bank money is an asset for
the customer and a liability for the bank.
While most of the monetary instruments used in economic transactions are the
liabilities of private financial institutions, payment settlement between them (and
between them and the central bank) requires public money, issued by the central
bank. This entanglement between public and private instruments and institutions
makes the monetary system both “essentially hybrid” and inherently hierarchical
(Mehrling, 2013; Pistor, 2013). Central banks sit atop the hierarchy because their
liabilities (‘reserves’) serve as settlement money for commercial banks, and thus as
the ultimate liquidity backstop of the system. The second layer consists of the
liabilities of commercial banks (‘deposits’), which serve as money for the household
sector and the non-financial corporate sector. A third layer consists of the liabilities
of shadow bank institutions (such as money market funds and repo dealers), which
serve as “shadow money” for other financial and non-financial firms (Gabor &
Vestergaard, 2016; Murau, 2017).
The Euro-currency market, in which banks accept deposits and issue loans
denominated in foreign currencies, can be understood as a form of shadow bank-
ing system at the international level (Ricks, 2016). The regulatory tools of the
Bretton Woods period – reserve requirements, caps on deposit rates, international
exchange controls – were premised on the assumption that money creation occurs
onshore: US banks create money by issuing loans to borrowers in the United States
using the US dollar as unit of account, UK banks do the same in the United
Kingdom using Pound Sterling, etc. In other words, this “embedded liberalism”
(Ruggie, 1982) rested on the assumption of the “triple coincidence,” an overlap
between the GDP area, the political decision-making unit, and the monetary area
(Avdjiev et al., 2015). From this perspective, there was no need to manage infra-
structural entanglements at the international level. It turned out, however, that
money could also be created offshore, denominated in a currency different from
that of the country hosting the issuing bank (Murau, 2018). Thus, banks located in
London began to issue US dollar-denominated loans in the late 1950s, thereby cre-
ating ‘Eurodollars’ (Burn, 2006). As private banks in other developed countries and
borrowers in developing countries joined the Eurodollar market, a global dollar
area emerged that existed in parallel to many domestic monetary systems.
Whereas the negative integration hypothesis considers liberalization a sufficient
condition for the global expansion of the Eurodollar market, the hybridity view of
money implies that this expansion could not have occurred without substantial
public institution-building at the international level. Consider why the domestic
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Figure 1. Bank deposit creation as a swap of IOUs.
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 5
with the liabilities of the central bank. This par relationship is underpinned by a
sophisticated public backstop infrastructure for bank deposits, notably in the form
of public supervision, deposit insurance, and lender-of-last-resort guarantees. Next,
consider shadow bank liabilities, such as money market fund shares. Such “shadow
money” lacks explicit public backstops but tends to benefit from market actors’
expectations that concerns over “systemic risk” will bring central banks
“accommodation” (Murau, 2017; €Ozg€ode, 2019). The same need for public protec-
tion exists at the international level. If anything, the moneyness of Eurodollar
deposits is even more institutionally demanding. Even if a central bank decides to
backstop the foreign-currency liabilities of its domestic banks, its ability to do so is
limited by its own foreign-currency reserves (Awrey, 2018). The problem is further
exacerbated by the difficulties in assessing counterparty risk that result from depos-
itors, banks, and borrowers often residing on three different continents – as in the
paradigmatic case of petrodollar ‘recycling.’ The task of building institutions that
could alleviate these problems in the emerging offshore US dollar system was
assumed by monetary technocrats.
2.2. Monetary technocrats: public servants in private markets
The hybridity view of international money implies that financial globalization
required an institutional infrastructure at the international level. Who are the
actors that can bring about such positive integration? In principle, governments (or
states) may cooperate, reach agreements, and establish formal international institu-
tions in order to provide this type of global public good. In practice, however, this
task requires a degree of mutual trust and a proximity of the regulator to the regu-
lated that are difficult to achieve for governments, but are the bread and butter of
international cooperation by technocrats.
The international agency of national technocrats is well established in IPE. Two
broad mechanisms explain the international role of technocrats with formally domestic
mandates. First, frequent and regular meetings of national technocrats with their for-
eign peers inspire mutual trust and spur cooperative behavior at the international
level (Keohane, 2005; Milner, 2009). Second, domestic technocrats are often part of
international epistemic communities (Adler & Haas, 1992; Haas, 1992; King, 2005)
or global networks (Levi-Faur, 2005; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Stone, 2004). Within
those communities and networks, international cooperation is facilitated by shared
intellectual frameworks (Babb, 2007; Clift, 2018; Major, 2014) and professional
norms (Abbott et al., 2016; Porter, 2003; Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2014).
Both mechanisms apply to central bankers. Although they are appointed by and
receive their mandates from government, they enjoy significant autonomy in their
interactions at the international level (Best, 2005; Clement & Toniolo, 2005; Kapstein,
1992).2 Their capacity to act with relative autonomy is bolstered by their (carefully cul-
tivated) epistemic authority in a notoriously complex field (Braun, 2018b).
An important scope condition for central bankers’ international agency is the
organization of international monetary cooperation (Block, 1977; Cohen, 1978;
Fioretos, 2019). The Great Depression and World War II reduced the world to a
“financially underdeveloped state” (Mehrling, 2015, p. 313) and decimated the
international network of monetary technocrats (Ikenberry, 1992, p. 293). Only with
the Bretton Woods system was the network gradually revived (Russell, 1973). By
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the 1960s, central bank governors and their deputies had established “a close per-
sonal network and high degree of consultation,” institutionalized in the form of
monthly meetings at the BIS in Basel (Spero, 1980, p. 153). Helleiner (1994, pp. 16,
18) has described the “increasingly sophisticated ‘regime’ based around the Bank
for International Settlements” in the 1970s, while Kapstein (1992) has stopped just
short of calling international central bank circles in the 1980s an epistemic commu-
nity. Recent research on international monetary history, spurred by newly available
archival material, provides ample new evidence of the international agency of cen-
tral bankers from the 1960s to the 1980s (Altamura, 2017; Green, 2016; Kershaw,
2018; Mourlon-Druol, 2015).
We contribute to the IPE literature by giving an account of the international
role of monetary technocrats that also accounts for their special role as intermedia-
ries between the public and the private components of the credit money system.
Monetary technocrats are different from other technocrats in that they directly par-
ticipate in private markets. They govern not only through administrative authority
but also (and often primarily) through transactions in financial markets (Braun,
2018a; Hockett & Omarova, 2015). We capture this special status of monetary tech-
nocrats by defining them as publics servants acting in private markets. Figure 2
illustrates the special position monetary technocrats occupy at the interface between
states and financial markets.
2.3. Positive integration through governability and protection
The hallmark of hybrid credit money systems is public-private infrastructural
entanglement. Each side provides an indispensable infrastructure to the other –
central banks depend on private financial actors to implement monetary policy,
while private financial actors depend on central bank liquidity backstops.
Regardless of the specifics of their mandates, monetary technocrats therefore pur-
sue two key goals – the governability of the economy, and the protection of private
financial institutions from destabilizing losses. Failure to attain these goals hampers
financial markets in general, and international markets in particular. We therefore
use the concept of “positive integration” to capture that part of central bankers’
institutional work that involves coordination with their foreign peers.
We define governability as the ability to use monetary policy instruments, such
as open market operations, to achieve specific policy objectives, such as price stabil-
ity. Since interest rate signals are propagated via financial markets, the latter are an
Figure 2. States, markets, and monetary technocrats in a credit money system.
Source: Authors’ own illustration.
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integral part of the infrastructure of monetary governance (Braun, 2018a). To man-
age this infrastructural entanglement for the purpose of establishing and sustaining
monetary governability, central banks have always shaped financial markets – by
changing how they transact with private counterparties, by privileging certain types
of financial instruments over others, by building up entire market segments, or by
lobbying governments for policy changes (Gabor & Ban, 2016; Knafo, 2013;
Krippner, 2011; Sissoko, 2019; Walter & Wansleben, 2019). Abrupt changes on either
side of the infrastructural entanglement can put monetary governability in jeopardy.
These changes can originate on the public side, as in the case of international monet-
ary regime changes (Krampf, 2019), or on the private side. When private actors
innovate and financial markets cease to operate according to the central bank’s mod-
els and expectations, central banks may reign in innovation and/or adapt their gov-
ernance techniques. In the case of the Eurodollar market, central banks chose to
adapt, notably by entering into Eurodollar transactions with their domestic banks.
The second goal of central bankers is to protect the issuers and users of credit
money against losses. This protection, which takes the form of regulatory oversight
and liquidity backstops, is an integral part of the infrastructure of private money
creation, and is closely intertwined with the notion of “systemic risk” (€Ozg€ode,
2019). An important recent contribution has traced the formation of what the
authors call the doctrine of “unlimited protection,” which “eliminates the risk of
depositor loss [… ] and prevents any bank of significant size from failing, regard-
less of whether the bank poses a true systemic risk” (Calomiris et al., 2016, p. 50).
Whereas Calomiris et al. trace the evolution of this doctrine only at the domestic
level, the problem of protection becomes a lot more complicated when domestic
financial institutions issue debt instruments denominated in foreign currencies,
notably Euro-currency deposits. Since central banks may themselves run out of for-
eign-currency reserves, offshore credit money raises the question of an inter-
national lender of last resort. The long and varied history of the “global financial
safety net” offers various examples of attempts to establish emergency lending
mechanisms to mitigate the risks associated with cross-border lending and invest-
ments (Henning, 2015; McDowell, 2017). As we will show, important steps in this
history were taken by the Standing Committee on the Euro-currency Market.
In sum, governability and protection capture two types of mutual infrastructural
entanglements between public and private financial actors – public governance
depends on the private issuers of credit money while the private issuance of credit
money depends on public backstops. We argue that the expansion of the
Eurodollar market in the 1970s required not only liberalization but substantial
“positive integration.” This integration was primarily achieved by the monetary
technocrats tasked with managing the infrastructural entanglements of the hybrid
credit money system. Their institutional work was driven by concerns for monetary
governability and protection of private financial actors.
3. Monetary technocrats in action: the BIS standing committee on the
euro-currency market, 1971–79
The globalization of the Eurodollar market during the 1970s was a pivotal develop-
ment in postwar financial history. Figure 3 contextualizes this development in a
broader timeline.
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When the Bretton Woods system was established “there were no functioning
private markets” at the international level (Mehrling, 2016, p. 26). That is why,
when banks in the City of London started dealing in US dollar-denominated bank
deposits, this was immediately recognized as a “revolutionary reform of the monet-
ary system” (Einzig, 1964, p. x). From the early 1960s, partly driven by the newly
introduced Interest Equalization Tax (1963), US banks began to use the Eurodollar
market for their own purposes, turning it into an offshore segment of the New
York money market (Helleiner, 1994, pp. 85–86; Kindleberger, 1970, pp. 173–177).
During this consolidation period, ‘roundtrip’ transactions, originating and ending
in the US, came to dominate the Eurodollar market (He & McCauley, 2012).
While Nixon’s closing of the gold window in 1971 thrust the publicly adminis-
tered monetary system into crisis, the Eurodollar market continued to expand dur-
ing the 1970s, as it became the dominant channel to recycle petrodollars following
the 1973 oil shock (Eichengreen, 2019; Kapstein, 1994; Spiro, 1999). Between 1970
and 1977, the market’s net size increased sevenfold, from USD 60 billion to USD
400 billion (Burn, 2006, p. 19). The growth of the private market was accompanied
by significant growth of central banks’ ‘official Eurocurrency holdings’ – foreign-
currency deposits with Eurobanks used by central banks as substitutes for reserves
held in US assets such as treasuries. For US banks, foreign lending became the sin-
gle largest source of revenue in the 1970s (Guttentag & Herring, 1983, p. 2). On
the borrower side, developing economies accumulated foreign debt on a massive
scale. The foreign interest payments of the twelve largest borrowers increased from
$1.1 billion in 1970 (6 percent of their export earnings) to $18.4 billion in 1980 (14
percent of export earnings) (Lipson, 1981, p. 603).
While the Euro-currency market included offshore lending denominated in cur-
rencies other than the US dollar, Eurodollar deposits dominated, their market share
ranging from 72 per cent to 84 per cent between 1964 and 1984 (Battilossi, 2010,
p. 31). Following the ‘Volcker shock’ in 1979, which helped trigger the debt crisis
in Eurodollar-inundated Latin America, the Eurodollar market emerged as the
backbone of the international monetary system (Mehrling, 2015; Murau, 2018).
Our empirical analysis focuses on the Standing Committee on the Euro-currency
Market, established in April 1971 by the G-10 central banks under the auspices of
the BIS.3 Our primary sources consist of the archival documents of the Standing
Committee, which include background papers and correspondences (henceforth:
‘SCEM’, 1971–79) and the informal records of the conversations taking place in the
Committee (henceforth ‘Informal Records’, 1971-1978).4 The Standing Committee
Figure 3. Evolution of the Eurodollar market and the rise of financial globalization.
Source: Authors’ own illustration.
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consisted mostly of board-level central bank representatives who met regularly in
Basel to discuss and, in some instances, coordinate policies related to the inter-
national monetary and financial system. Established at the beginning of the most
turbulent period in international monetary affairs since the interwar years, the
Standing Committee had no rivals as the effective headquarters of global monet-
ary governance.
At a moment of unprecedented epistemic uncertainty, when even experts had
trouble making sense of international monetary developments, much of the
Standing Committee’s power derived from its unique position as a high-level forum
for collective technocratic puzzling and decision-making. Our analysis reveals a
consistent focus on maintaining domestic monetary governability. Central bankers
in Basel puzzled over the inflationary impact of the Eurodollar market, negotiated
over the appropriate regulatory regime, and built an infrastructure for data collec-
tion and dissemination. At the same time, central banks were eager to provide pro-
tection for private banks active in the Eurodollar market. Initially they supported
the market via their own Eurodollar deposits and swaps with their domestic banks,
before providing an implicit backstop guarantee in 1974. With these efforts, central
bankers meeting in Basel produced a level of positive integration going well beyond
mere liberalization. Monetary technocrats helped globalize the Eurodollar market.
3.1. Maintaining governability
From February 1971 to February 1973, as the Bretton Woods system was disinte-
grating and inflation rising in advanced economies, the work of the Committee
was dominated by concerns of monetary governability. Most committee members
worried that “the Euro-currency market has an adverse impact on the effectiveness
of domestic monetary policy” (Informal Records, 18 February 1971, Annex I, p. 2).
It was this concern that drove the conversion of the Ad hoc Committee on the
Euro-currency Market into the Standing Committee, which was tasked to study “the
conditions under which the Euro-currency market has an inflationary impact and
possible ways and means of reducing or eliminating such impact” (Informal
Records, 18 April 1971, p. 1). In other words, the Committee was born from
“epistemic uncertainty” (Nelson & Katzenstein, 2014, p. 362) and tasked with estab-
lishing a shared understanding of the causes and consequences of the Eurodollar
market that could serve as new convention to guide the Committee’s work.
3.1.1. Assessing the inflationary impact of the Euro-currency markets
During the first few meetings, the Standing Committee struggled to reconcile the
Euro-currency market phenomenon with its then-conventional notions of fractional
reserve banking and the money multiplier. This theoretical perspective exaggerated
the connection between reserves (liabilities of the Fed), onshore US dollar deposits
(liabilities of US banks), and offshore Eurodollar deposits (liabilities of non-US
banks). In practice, dramatic changes in bank liability management in the 1960s
and 1970s had loosened this connection (Battilossi, 2010; Walter & Wansleben,
2019). Simply put, banks learned to manage their liabilities with a view towards
smoothing payment outflows, thus reducing their need for reserves (or, in the case
of Euro-banks, their need for US onshore deposits). The debate over how to
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reconcile outdated monetary theories with the fast-evolving reality of the
Eurodollar market took place both in a series of technical papers (Fratianni &
Savona, 1971; Friedman, 1969; Klopstock, 1970; Machlup, 1970) and inside the
Standing Committee. There, members disagreed on whether autonomous money
creation occurred in the Euro-currency markets via “the multiplier effect of the
Eurodollar market, which some regard as enabling the Euro-banks to create depos-
its by granting credits, as national banking systems do” (SCEM, 42-5578 to 42-
5587, p. 4). Pointing to epistemic uncertainty, the Banque de France referred to
measurement problems and admitted that it had tried to study “the extent of credit
creation in the market,” but “without much success” (Informal Records, 17
February 1971, pp. 7–8). In general, Committee members found it “difficult to dif-
ferentiate between Euro-currency flows and short-term capital flows in general”
(Informal Records, 8 January 1972, p. 6).
To settle those questions, the BIS circulated a questionnaire in January 1972 to
assess the impact of the offshore Euro-currency markets on the governability of the
onshore monetary systems. The central banks’ answers to the questionnaire differed
substantially. Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and
Canada affirmed that “inflows from or outflows to the Euro-currency market [… ]
have at times interfered with the achievement of the objectives of [our] central
bank (a) with respect to domestic monetary management [… and] (b) with respect
to the balance of payments” (SCEM, 42-028367). Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the United States were agnostic, whereas Japan reported having encountered no
problems (Informal Records, 12 February 1972, p. 1). At the same time, Canada,
France, Italy, Switzerland and the United States agreed that “flows of Euro-funds
had at times helped central banks achieve their objectives,” whereas Belgium,
Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands disagreed (Informal Records, 12
February 1972, pp. 1-2). Eight central banks believed that the Euro-currency mar-
ket had “adverse effects on the general inflationary climate,” whereas Canada and
the United Kingdom did not. The Federal Reserve argued that the effect was infla-
tionary only if central banks fueled the Euro-currency market “with their own
placements” (Informal Records, 12 February 1972, p. 2).
While epistemic uncertainty in the Standing Committee was genuine, the
answers to the questionnaire, in particular those of the Bank of England, were con-
spicuously consistent with national interests (Burn, 2006; Helleiner, 1994). Where
continental Europeans and the Federal Reserve saw potential downsides for govern-
ability from the expansion of the Eurodollar market, the Bank of England saw
potential upsides. In spite of the inconclusiveness of these results and the ensuing
discussions in Basel (Informal Records, 12 February 1972), a report on The
Monetary Impact of the Euro-Currency Market listed three areas of agreement:
short-term money inflows increased inflationary pressures, thus interfering with
domestic monetary governance; international flows were increased by the flow of
Euro-funds; and the efficacy of direct controls was “real but limited” (SCEM, 42-
6927 to 42-6938, p. 2).
The main effect of the interim report, however, was that the initial assumption
guiding the Committee’s work could not be proved. The questionnaire did not
yield clear evidence that the Euro-currency markets were inflationary. Instead, cen-
tral bankers reassured themselves that that Euro-currency markets did not unduly
undermine domestic monetary governability.
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3.1.2. Negotiating a regulatory regime for the Euro-currency markets
Following the interim report, the Committee was tasked by the G-10 central bank
governors with formulating joint regulatory responses to two main questions: First,
should the G-10 central banks treat offshore money creation in a given monetary
jurisdiction as identical to onshore money creation and therefore introduce inter-
national regulations for banks in the Euro-currency markets such as “reserve
requirements, guide-lines or ceilings on bank credit” (SCEM, 42-6927 to 42-6938,
p. 2); and second, should central banks intervene in the Eurodollar market to
restrict the movement of funds and apply policy measures such as controls and
open market operations? (SCEM, 42-6927 to 42-6938, p. 3).
From April 1972, a clear conflict emerged that pitted the Bundesbank and the
Banca di Italia against the Bank of England, with the Federal Reserve positioned in
the middle (Altamura, 2017, pp. 89-93). By September 1972, two concrete regula-
tory proposals were on the table. The Bundesbank suggested that all major coun-
tries should impose restrictions such that “the interest rate attraction of the market
and its inflationary impact would be considerably reduced” (Informal Records, 9
September 1972, Annex, p. 2). The Bank of Italy proposed that a “regulated area” –
the European Common Market member countries in favor of regulation – should
be shielded from undesired foreign inflows through reserve requirements and a
“Bardepot” (Informal Records, 9 September 1972, Annex, pp. 2–3). Further refined
by BIS staff in January 1973 (Informal Records, 10 February 1973, p. 1), these pro-
posals presented – as the Bank of England admitted in an internal memo – “an
entirely coherent framework for dealing with problems of monetary flows between
the regulated and the outside world” (cited in Altamura, 2017, p, 97).
The Committee, however, was unable to reach a consensus. In February 1973, it
decided not to implement any of the plans for an international regulatory regime.
The Bank of England even requested that the work on Euro-currency market regu-
lation be discontinued (SCEM, 43-33958, p. 1). Was this outcome, which repre-
sented a clear victory for the Bank of England, influenced by the deliberations in
the Standing Committee? The archival record indicates that the question of monet-
ary governability was at the center of these deliberations. The Bank of England did
not ‘win’ by convincing its German and Italian peers that monetary governability
was not a problem, which clearly it was in 1970s Britain (Schenk, 2010). Instead,
the discussions in the Standing Committee continued to be marred by epistemic
uncertainty, and the central banks advocating regulation were unable to decide the
governability debate in their favor. During the meetings in late 1972 and early
1973, central bankers who initially held strong pro-regulation views accepted the
narrative that the Euro-currency markets had some positive and some negative
effects on monetary governability (Informal Records, 9 December 1972 & 6
January 1973). In the decisive meeting of February 1973, there was no majority in
the Standing Committee to implement international regulations because the case
had not been convincingly made that the offshore Eurodollar market impeded the
working of the onshore monetary system (Informal Records, 10 February 1973).
3.1.3. Providing technical support for the Euro-currency markets
Once stricter regulation was off the table, the Standing Committee reinforced its
efforts to overcome epistemic uncertainty over the nature and dynamics of the
12 B. BRAUN ET AL.
Euro-currency markets by collecting and disseminating data about the market. The
archival records show that the G-10 central banks decided to collect and publicize
data about flows and exposures with the explicit goal of improving private bankers’
ability to assess borrower risk in the Eurodollar market.
The market-facing orientation of the Standing Committee’s data gathering
effort was clearly stated in the letter that launched this work. On 7 February
1974, the Secretary General of the OECD wrote to his BIS counterpart that it
would be desirable “for the operations of private bankers, if more data could be
collected and, if possible, published in a suitable form” (SCEM 44-5070). In a
December 1975 meeting of the Standing Committee, Kit McMahon of the Bank
of England emphasized the importance of better Euro-currency statistics “so
that governments and the banking world would have more to go on in judging
how countries’ situations were developing” (Informal Records, 8 December
1975, p. 2, emphasis added). His colleague, John Sangster, defended the idea of
publishing data on bank lending to developing countries on the grounds that
“the banks that provided these data in the first place would very much like to
see the consolidated figures for these countries, from the point of view of their
own credit risk management” (Informal Records, 8 December 1975, p. 7,
emphasis added).
Beginning in the mid-1970s, banks located in non-G10 financial centers
became increasingly important players in the Eurodollar market. Obtaining data
from offshore centers such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Bahrain, and Panama
therefore turned into a key concern for the Standing Committee. At that point,
other international organizations for the first time became interested in the
Eurodollar market. The central bankers in the Standing Committee, however,
were strictly opposed to any incursions into their Euro-currency jurisdiction.
When Kit McMahon of the Bank of England warned that a “number of inter-
national institutions – the IMF, the IBRD, the OECD and even the EEC – were
becoming increasingly interested in the market, he urged his colleagues to ramp
up the BIS’s data operation in order to ward off potential demands from these
much larger organizations (Informal Records, 8 December 1975, p. 1). A BIS staff
note to Committee Chair Rene Larre noted a strong preference among Standing
Committee members “to have such discussions here in the Standing Committee,
rather than leave them to be done by the OECD” (Informal Records, 7 November
1975). Rene Larre himself was “strongly opposed” to the idea of cooperating with
other institutions, “whose presence at meetings would turn the committee into a
forum for useless controversies and polemics” (Informal Records, 8 December
1975, p.5).
The controversy highlights the Standing Committee’s self-identification as the
technocratic headquarters of the Eurodollar market, distinct from other, more
intergovernmental fora of global financial governance. It also shows that central
bankers sought to shield the Euro-currency markets from external intervention.
In sum, the Standing Committee changed its view of the Euro-currency markets
radically between 1971 and 1974. Starting off with grave concerns about their
negative consequences for monetary governability, the Committee over time rede-
fined their role from regulators to data infrastructure providers for the Euro-cur-
rency markets.
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3.2. Protection: towards a lender-of-last-resort infrastructure
A fundamental problem of the international monetary system in the 1970s was –
and still is today – the absence of an international lender of last resort (Fischer,
1999; Guttentag & Herring, 1983; McDowell, 2017). When domestic banks accept
deposits – and thus incur liabilities – in foreign currencies, the central banks’ abil-
ity to backstop the banking system is limited by their own holdings of (or access
to) foreign currency reserves. This exacerbates the problem of protection – the
backstopping of private credit money by public central banks (Awrey, 2018). Our
historical analysis reveals that central banks grappled with this problem from the
beginning, using official Eurodollar deposits and swaps to stabilize the Eurodollar
market. Following the 1973 oil shock, Euro-banks assumed the quasi-public func-
tion of ‘recycling’ the large capital surpluses of oil-exporting countries. When the
1974 bank failures exposed the vulnerability of that arrangement, monetary techno-
crats took the decisive step of providing a coordinated commitment to backstop
the market if necessary.
3.2.1. Central bank support, writ small: official deposits and swaps to manage
Euro-banks
In the course of their puzzling over the inflationary impact of offshore money, the
members of the Standing Committee made a striking discovery – to a considerable
extent, they had themselves fueled the growth of the Euro-currency markets.
Dating back to at least 1960 (Informal Records, 1 June 1971, p. 18), most central
banks in the Standing Committee had conducted sizeable Eurodollar transactions
with their domestic banks, in the form of official deposits and swaps. Driven by a
desire to stabilize liquidity conditions for the benefit of private banks and of the
central bank’s domestic monetary control, these interventions called into question
central bankers’ initial view of offshore money as a purely private, market-driven
innovation. Official deposits and swaps became a major focus of the Standing
Committee’s work in the second half of 1971 (Informal Records, 8 May, 1 June, 10
July and 6 November 1971).
Central bank deposits – which did not, as a rule, require government approval –
were part of the institutional infrastructure of the Eurodollar market. Central banks
increased the Eurodollar liabilities of their domestic banks by using them as an
alternative to conventional foreign exchange assets, such as US government debt.
Consider a central bank selling US dollar-denominated assets, such as US govern-
ment bonds, and transferring the proceeds to a Euro-bank (a non-US commercial
bank accepting Eurodollar deposits). In that case, this ‘official deposit’ created both
a new Eurodollar liability and a corresponding asset – a deposit with a US bank –
for the Euro-bank. Crucially, such central banks deposits “would probably not be
placed with foreign commercial banks if there were no Eurodollar market” (SCEM,
42-5578 to 42-5587, p. 4). Official deposits thus increased the net size of the
Eurodollar market, with potentially inflationary consequences.
The second type of transaction central banks used for governability purposes
were US dollar swaps with commercial banks, whereby central banks sold US dol-
lars spot rate and repurchased them forward. Such swaps could serve a variety of
monetary policy purposes: They enabled central banks to control domestic liquid-
ity, slow down increases in their official monetary reserves, repay external debt,
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facilitate trade finance, and regulate conditions in the exchange market (SCEM,
42-4899 to 42-4910, pp. 2-3). At the same time, swaps provided additional
Eurodollar liquidity to Euro-banks. While the Bundesbank thought that swaps
expanded the Eurodollar market and wanted to restrict their use, the Banque de
France argued that swaps were an important monetary policy instrument and
that central banks “should not destroy their existing systems of domestic monet-
ary control for the sake of marginal result” (Informal Records, 10 July 1971,
p. 5). While US dollar swaps were used by the majority of central banks, the
heaviest users were the Bank of Italy and the Bank of Japan who pursued indus-
trial policy and trade finance goals in addition to monetary policy objectives
(Informal Records, 10 July 1971).
Official deposits and swaps were the Eurodollar equivalent of domestic-cur-
rency open market operations – a way of managing the infrastructural
entanglement between private financial institutions and public monetary policy.
By engaging in these transactions, and by using the Eurodollar market to gov-
ern domestic monetary and financial conditions, central banks effectively con-
doned – and bolstered – the Eurodollar market in their jurisdictions.
According to estimates of the BIS, 20 percent of the net Euro-currency market
consisted of central bank deposits (Informal Records, 8 May 1971, p. 4). The
BIS revealed that it had itself made substantial placements (Informal Records, 1
June 1971, p. 4).
Standing Committee members, baffled by these numbers, resolved that G-10
central banks “should not place money directly in the Euro-currency market”
except for “exceptional reasons” (Informal Records, 1 June 1971, p. 10). In this
case, the Standing Committee was able to reach a consensus over policy measures
which were swiftly implemented by all participating central banks. Members felt
the need to publicly demonstrate agency. The Bank of England’s Jeremy Morse
noted that “there was a lot of agitation going on for something to be done about
the Euro-dollar market and it might be a good idea, therefore, to feed those who
were calling for action with something” (Informal Records, 1 June 1971, p. 10).
The financial press reported that the G10 central banks would “abstain from mak-
ing further deposits in the market,” possibly even reducing outstanding central
bank deposits (Financial Times, 15 June 1971).
The unanimity in the Standing Committee notwithstanding, however, central
bank compliance with the informal “standstill agreement” to scale back official
deposits proved weak. In early 1972, the Bundesbank’s Otmar Emminger suggested
that central banks coordinate their diversification out of dollar assets (such as US
government bonds) into Eurodollar deposits, while calling for “a mechanism for
shifting central-bank funds, when necessary, out of the Euro-currency market back
to the United States” (Informal Records, 6 April 1972, pp. 5, 11). Fears expressed
by Committee members in 1978 that their own restraint “would do nothing to stop
the growth of other [non-G10] central banks’ Euro-currency deposits” (SCEM, 49-
4513, p. 8) suggest that official deposits remained an indispensable component of
the Eurodollar market throughout the 1970s.
The failure of central banks to comply with the Standstill Agreement shows that
they depended on this tool to both protect their domestic banks in the Eurodollar
market and to exercise control over domestic monetary conditions.
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3.2.2. Central bank support, writ large: setting up an implicit backstop for
Euro-banks
After the Standing Committee had been on the brink of deciding to regulate the
Eurodollar market in February 1973, the oil shock in October 1973 brought about
an “epochal” shift in its priorities (Altamura, 2017, p. 99). Monetary technocrats
came to see the Eurodollar market as the solution to the problem of “petrodollar
recycling.” The quadrupling of the global oil price between October 1973 and
March 1974 created large dollar surpluses in the oil-exporting countries, and defi-
cits for oil-importers. These imbalances created a financial intermediation problem
– the surpluses were too large for OPEC countries to spend them entirely on
imports, while oil-importing countries needed to borrow in dollars in order to pay
for dollar-denominated oil. Although the metaphor of ‘petrodollar recycling’ was
apt, it is more instructive to think of the issue as two distinct questions: First,
whose liabilities should absorb the oil-exporting countries’ savings in the form of
(Euro)dollar credit money balances? And second, who should finance the greatly
increased current account deficits of the oil-importing countries?
In principle, the OPEC countries could have done what Japan and China did in
the 2000s by investing surpluses directly in US treasuries. In fact, in an agreement
that would remain secret for more than two decades, the US encouraged Saudi
Arabia to do precisely that (Spiro, 1999; Thompson, 2017, p. 96). Such direct
investments in the liabilities of Western governments and international organiza-
tions would have been compatible with a public solution to the second problem:
Assuming the role of intermediaries, Western governments and international
organizations could have extended loans to developing countries in need of dollars.
Such recycling via public balance sheets – the “oil facility” established by the IMF
in June 1974 was one example (Kapstein, 1994, p. 68) – would have been in line
with how international liquidity had been intermediated during the Bretton Woods
system. Indeed, most G-10 central banks initially expected this to be the default
solution (Kershaw, 2018, p. 305). Even private US banks, aware of the risks they
would incur in the absence of an international lender-of-last-resort infrastructure,
“felt recycling was the proper domain of the government” (Spiro, 1999, p. 37).
The key actor pushing for recycling via private financial institutions was the US
Treasury, then led by William E. Simon (Kershaw, 2018, p. 305).5 At the time
European banks offered higher interest rates than American banks and attracted
deposits not only from oil exporting countries but also from US residents. Fearing
that a public solution to the recycling problem would further diminish capital
inflows to the United States, Simon pushed for recycling via financial markets
(ibid.). Bolstered by this US Treasury support, a consensus quickly emerged among
bankers and central bankers that petrodollars should be absorbed by private banks
(both American and European), and that these banks should make loans to devel-
oping countries, as illustrated in Figure 4 (Altamura, 2017, p. ch. 3). These loans
financed more than oil imports. By mitigating the need for internal adjustment in
the Global South, petrodollar recycling also bolstered demand for the exports of
fragile developed economies – developing countries became the “borrowers of last
resort” of the global economy (Griffith-Jones, 2000, p. 250). This unprecedented
expansion of private Eurodollar lending to developing countries could not have
occurred without a concomitant expansion of a public infrastructure of protection.
One element of that infrastructure was export credit guarantees through which
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national governments subsidized private bank loans to foreign importers.6 Another
key element was the efforts by monetary technocrats to replicate, at the inter-
national level, the semblance of an infrastructure of protection for the
Eurodollar market.
In the wake of the oil shock, the lender of last resort question featured promin-
ently in Basel. The Standing Committee noted that despite the absence of an inter-
national lender of last resort, “the principal central banks could not, in practice, be
indifferent to the emergence of major liquidity problems in the market” (SCEM,
45-1137). The problem was aggravated by uncertainty over who would be respon-
sible for foreign branches operating within a central bank’s jurisdiction but in a
currency other than its own. In April 1974, Larre circulated a questionnaire
(SCEM, 45-0528), submitted by the Dutch central bank, that sought information
about each central bank’s interpretation of its “responsibilities as a lender of last
resort in relation to Euro-banking operations.” The response of the Bank of
Sweden (SCEM, 45-04972) stated particularly clearly that in the unlikely case of a
Swedish bank suffering losses on its foreign-currency loans, “it seems unlikely that
the central bank would refuse to sell, within limits set by the size of its reserves,
the currencies which the commercial bank requires to meet its foreign liabilities.”
The Dutch questionnaire also inquired about “the attitude of the central banks
towards their own Euro-market placements.” After the Committee members had
agreed, in 1971, to freeze their official placements in the Euro-currency markets, a
1974 paper on “the impact of the oil situation” was ambiguous (SCEM, 44-5651).
It noted the need to “avoid adding to the process of ‘reserve creation’ through the
Euro-currency market by continuing to abstain from increasing their official Euro-
currency deposits.” On the other hand, the paper highlighted that the presence of
official central bank deposits during calm periods was likely to create the expect-
ation among commercial banks that central banks would also stand ready to pro-
vide liquidity under conditions of market stress. By this logic, abstaining from
official placements “could, in the case of a liquidity shortage developing in the
Euro-market, conflict with central banks’ responsibilities as lenders of last resort.”
Circulated in April 1974, the lender-of-last-resort questionnaire could not have
been timelier. It was followed, in the summer of 1974, by the two most consequen-
tial financial events of the 1970s. First, surging interbank lending rates precipitated
the first major run on the US interbank money market, the most prominent victim
of which was Franklin National Bank, which had moved aggressively into the
Eurodollar market (Spero, 1980, p. 91). Second, on 26 June 1974, Bankhaus
Herstatt, a mid-sized German bank that was active in the Eurodollar market, failed
(Schenk, 2014). The fallout from Herstatt’s sudden collapse led to the establishment
of a second major committee – the Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices, subsequently the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision –
and had a lasting impact on banking supervision and regulation (Goodhart, 2011;
Mourlon-Druol, 2015).
Borrower Euro-bank Oil exporter









Figure 4. Petrodollar recycling via the Eurodollar market.
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The Franklin National and Herstatt episodes immediately preceded what could
be described as the Eurodollar-market’s “whatever it takes” moment. In meetings
of G-6 finance ministers and central bank governors over the weekend of 6-8
September, the pressure on central banks mounted to produce a reassuring
announcement regarding lender-of-last-resort support for the Euro-currency mar-
kets (Goodhart, 2011, pp. 36-40). Following a meeting in Basel on 9 September, the
G-10 governors finally published a short joint communique on 10 September, the
final paragraph of which read:
The Governors also had an exchange of views on the problem of the lender of last resort
in the Euro-markets. They recognised that it would not be practical to lay down in
advance detailed rules and procedures for the provision of temporary liquidity. But they
were satisfied that means are available for that purpose and will be used if and
when necessary.
As is usually the case when it comes to the lender-of-last-resort question, the
statement is deliberately vague. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that
the October edition of Euromoney opened with an editorial that claimed that the
actual G10 agreement went above and beyond the official communique:
International bankers were profoundly disappointed by the apparent lack of progress at the
September Basel meeting of central bankers on support for commercial banks. … In fact,
however, not only was there a wider degree of agreement in July then was revealed at the
time, but by September this had hardened into a firm commitment by all the countries
present (the group of 10 plus Switzerland) on these points: 1. Banks that get into liquidity
difficulties with the national boundaries will be supported by the central bank concerned.
[… ] These points were not spelled out in the official communication because of legal
constraints on some of the central monetary authorities involved.
The next informal meeting record of the Standing Committee, dating from
December 1975, makes no reference to the communique. The respective folder in
the BIS archive does, however, contain a copy of the Euromoney editorial, followed
by a hand-written note in French, signed “RF,” that says (clearly referring to the
editorial): “Erroneous interpretation of the ‘Basel Accord’ of 10.9.1974”
(“Interpretation erronnee de ‘l’Accord de Ba^le’ du 10.9.1974”). We have not been
able to determine who wrote the note, nor when.
What had the G-10 central bankers agreed on in Basel? The question was hotly
debated among monetary technocrats as well as market participants at the time.
Two finance professors and contemporary observers, citing “off-the-record discus-
sions we have had with policy-makers who were directly involved,” speculated that
the Euromoney editorial was inaccurate (Guttentag & Herring, 1983, p. 20). At a
1977 symposium, however, both Kit McMahon (Executive Director, Bank of
England) and Henry C. Wallich (Board of Governors, Federal Reserve) presented
papers on the international lender-of-last-resort question, describing the 1974 Basel
statement as an expression of the underlying understanding among central bankers
that lender of last resort support for Eurodollar banks would be forthcoming if
necessary (McMahon, 1977; Wallich, 1977). Referring specifically to McMahon and
Wallich, an IMF paper concluded that “the infrastructure for providing inter-
national assistance by lenders of last resort was in place” (Johnson & Abrams,
1983, p. 34). The question of the true meaning of the statement notwithstanding,
contemporary market participants clearly interpreted it as signaling central bank
support for the Eurodollar market. When, in November 1974, Euromoney asked
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six financial experts whether they expected the “agreement on support for banks in
trouble” was “likely to prove of any great practical importance,” one respondent
highlighted the positive “psychological effect” of the communique, while another
expected it would “bolster confidence” (Goodhart, 2011, p. 41).
Ultimately, the question of technocratic intent is secondary to our argument,
which hinges on market perception. From this perspective, we argue, the message
of protection given by the Standing Committee was a necessary condition for rapid
expansion and globalization of the offshore US dollar system in the 1970s.
4. Conclusion
This article challenges the view, prevalent in IPE, that the liberalization of financial
markets – a form of negative integration, actively pursued by governments – was a
sufficient condition for financial globalization during the 1970s. Revisiting the
expansion of the Eurodollar market during that pivotal period, we argue that for-
eign-currency lending by private banks on a global scale required a substantial
degree of positive integration.
Our historical analysis focuses on monetary technocrats as the key agents whose
institutional work brought about this positive integration. We trace how the
Standing Committee on the Euro-currency Market at the BIS in Basel managed
the infrastructural entanglements between the public and the private elements of
the inherently hybrid Eurodollar system. On one hand, private financial markets
serve as the infrastructure through which central banks seek to implement and
transmit public monetary policy. The governability of their domestic economies
being the principal goal of central banks, they are ready to repress financial innov-
ation – in this case, the Eurodollar market – if it damages the governance infra-
structure of monetary policy. On the other hand, central banks sit at the top of a
hierarchical monetary and financial system, and therefore serve as the ultimate
backstop to the system. This protection constitutes a public infrastructure for the
creation of private credit money. Analyzing archival records from the Standing
Committee, we show how, by managing these infrastructural entanglements at the
international level, monetary technocrats provided the positive integration that
underpinned the explosive growth of the Eurodollar market during the 1970s.
Although focused on the 1970s, our analysis yields broader insights for IPE.
First, our analysis shows the crucial role that specifically European technocrats,
convening in the G-10 setting at the BIS, had in the unfolding of financial global-
ization (Schelkle and Bohle, forthcoming). The decision reached in 1973 by the
Standing Committee not to regulate the Euro-currency markets paved the way for
petrodollar recycling on a global scale. At the same time, the intense discussions
over the governability implications of financial globalization provided an important
impetus for European monetary cooperation and financial integration. The German
position in the Standing Committee was generally geared towards preventing inter-
national regulatory institutions that would impede monetary union, while the
Italian proposal of a ‘regulated area’ would have implied a monetary union of sorts,
based on a common offshore currency. These concerns prefigured European mon-
etary technocrats’ aggressive push in the late 1990s to integrate European money
markets, as well as their post-crisis push to revive securitization markets. In both
cases, central bankers acted in pursuit of monetary governability concerns while
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actively bolstering the rise and resilience of market-based banking – and thus of
financialization – in the euro area (Braun, 2018a; Gabor & Ban, 2016). The pattern
of the pursuit of monetary governability by central banks (and finance ministries)
paving the road for financialization has played out repeatedly in various countries,
going back to the 1960s (Dutta, 2019; Lemoine, 2016; Walter & Wansleben, 2019).
Grasping the unique role of monetary technocrats as public-private intermediaries
is key to moving recent debates about technocratic governance in general, and cen-
tral bank independence in particular, beyond the confines of principal-agent theory
(Abbott et al., 2019; Jones & Matthijs, 2019; Mabbett & Schelkle, 2019).
Second, our analysis places the Eurodollar market back at the center of the pol-
itical economy of financial globalization and financialization. Somewhat paradoxic-
ally, little is known about the evolution of the Eurodollar market since the 1980s –
the topic all but disappeared from the IPE literature precisely when the Eurodollar
market had become the backbone of the international monetary and financial sys-
tem. Recent research, however, has shown that it is impossible to make sense of
financial globalization and US monetary power without a thorough understanding
of the offshore dollar system (Binder, 2019; Hardie & Maxfield, 2016; Hardie and
Thompson, forthcoming; Murau, 2018; Schwartz, 2019).
Closely related, a third question concerns the history of what today is commonly
described as the “global financial safety net” (Henning, 2015; McDowell, 2017). As
did the oil crisis of the early 1970s, subsequent episodes of stress in the Eurodollar
market – notably the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s, the Asian crisis
of 1998–99, and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09 – spurred monetary techno-
crats to gradually expand the Eurodollar market’s backstop infrastructure, culmi-
nating in the network of (partly unlimited) swap lines between the Fed and a select
number of other major central banks (McDowell, 2012; Sahasrabuddhe, 2019;
Tooze, 2018). The IPE literature tends to explain the emergence and resilience of
this “dollar world” as the result of US monetary power (Andrews, 2006). Without
denying the importance of state strategy, our analysis points towards the existence
of a long-standing, self-reinforcing feedback loop between monetary technocrats’
attempts at bolstering the resilience of the Eurodollar market and their struggle to
maintain governability in a world in which domestic monetary conditions have
increasingly followed a global financial cycle.
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Bank for International Settlements, Standing Committee on the Euro-Currency
Market (‘SCEM’), 1971-79.
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Notes
1. See, however, Germain (1997, p. 11), who emphasizes “the growing role of private
monetary agents within the IMS.” See also Goodman and Pauly (1993) and
Schwartz (2019).
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2. Monetary technocrats have been somewhat neglected in the recent debate about the
systemic versus the domestic features of the international monetary and financial
system (Chaudoin & Milner, 2017; Cohen, 2017).
3. The G-10 originally comprised the countries that in 1962 agreed to participate in the
IMF’s General Agreement to Borrow: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Switzerland
joined as the eleventh member in 1964. The Federal Reserve was a member of the
Standing Committee even though the United States did not join the BIS until 1994.
4. The archival record is incomplete. In many cases, documents submitted and statements
made by Federal Reserve representatives are missing. Although this limits our insights
into the positions of US representatives, the contributions of other Standing
Committee members most of the time allow us to reconstruct discussions.
5. Prior to his appointment in May 1974, Simon had directed the Federal Energy
Administration as Nixon’s ‘Energy Czar,’ managing US oil policy during the height of the
oil crisis. As a former senior partner at Salomon Brothers, he was also a Wall Street insider.
6. Efforts to contain the competitive use of these government guarantees led to the
establishment, in 1975, of the OECD “Export Credit Arrangement” (Moravcsik, 1989).
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